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Abstract: Since the 1990s, Sunstein, Jolls, and Thaler have questioned the perfect 
rationality assumption in law and economics and introduced a behavioral approach. But 
Gregory Mitchell has criticized behavioral law and economics. He argues that much of the 
scholarship within the field describes psychological research as if it provides general laws of 
thought and behavior rather than insights conditional on the setting, on the characteristics of 
subjects, and on the specificity of the task at hand. Human heterogeneity is not adequately 
included in models developed under behavioral assumptions of this kind. 
This paper argues that Mitchell’s work contributes to develop a cognitive approach to Law 
closer to the cognitive theory of institutions and to the Original Institutional Economics 
(OIE). Mitchell’s contextualist approach seeks to identify the specific conditions under 




In the middle of the last century, US scholars of law started applying the tools and the 
insights offered by the neoclassical economics to their inquiry into law (Coase, 1960; 
Calabresi, 1961; Posner, 1973). The aim of this new approach was to develop both a 
positive theory and a normative theory of law on which to build efficient legal norms 
(Posner, 1983, Cooter and Ulen, 2000).  
Standard economics models and econometric tools improve law and economics (L&E) 
investigation into two of its main focuses: 1. efficiency; efficiency is considered from 
two different points of view: on the one hand, it means that common law (judge-made 
law) is efficient; on the other, from a normative point of view, it also means that law 
must be efficient. 2. incentives and people’s responses to those incentives.  
L&E focuses on these two main issues to develop formal models to explain law-
making processes, trial and adjudication, and social reactions to law and institutions 
(Rowley, 1989). The use of economic tools in L&E has been widely criticized since the 
beginning of their application (Ellickson, 1989; Kelman, 1983). Many legal scholars 
have maintained that applying economic tools is not sufficient to investigate the logic 
underlying the law (Kelman, 1983). Moreover, they have argued that the reductionist 
approach of economics, which describes human behavior on strict assumptions that do 
not represent real behavior, cannot enable L&E to develop even a positive theory of 
law, and it excludes any consideration of justice from the analysis (Kennedy, 1981, 
Michelman, 1983).  
Since the first application of standard economics tools to law, the two disciplines have 
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been closely interconnected. Hence, L&E has been strongly influenced by the changes 
and debates that have characterized the development of economics since the middle of 
the last century (Rachlinski, 2000). In recent years, the results obtained by the behavioral 
approach to economics have given new emphasis to the first criticisms brought against 
L&E (Rachlinski, 1998). This approach suggests that human behavior deviates from the 
perfect rationality assumption. But it is possible to model and predict human behavior 
also when it is affected by biases, because these deviations are not completely random. 
During the 1990s authors such as Sunstein, Jolls and Thaler (1998), started investigating 
the opportunities offered by the insights derived from behavioral economics and they 
started a behavioral approach to L&E (BL&E) based on a more exhaustive theory of 
economic behavior whereby better understanding of the foundations of individual 
behavior should strengthen both the descriptive power of models and their normative 
power.  
In the same years in which behavioral economics emerged and the debate on the 
perspective of legal theory began, another important research field in economics was 
developing: cognitive economics (CE) (Egidi and Rizzello, 2004). Cognitive economics 
shares with the behavioral approach the idea that human behavior is complex and that 
economic theory must ground its theories on a better understanding of cognitive 
decision-making processes. 
Nevertheless, these two approaches have important differences and follow (almost 
partially) different paths of inquiry (Egidi and Rizzello, 2004). CE was born in 
opposition to neoclassical economics and it investigates economic problems as 
complex phenomena: its entire inquiry begins with the analysis of the micro-
foundations of human behavior. Cognitive economics is a school of thought based on 
the idea that the study of economic behavior has to be founded on the interdisciplinary 
approach. It strongly criticizes the assumptions of standard economics focusing on the 
complexity of decision-making processes of heterogeneous agents. It questions the 
predictions of most standard economics models and the rigidity of the formal tools 
applied. Its main object is to open the black-box containing all the processes through 
which preferences are formed and are translated into choices. CE is different from 
behavioral economics, whose methodology is based on the analysis of the effectively 
exhibited behaviors. This explains why cognitive economics critique to standard 
economics is substantial. The idea is that each phenomenon can be investigated with 
different tools and from different points of view. For example cognitive economics 
investigate interdependent decisions using game theory not as a formal tool to predict 
specific outcomes but as a framework of analysis that allows investigating the 
complexity of agents' decision making processes (Ambrosino, 2013, Schelling, 1960); 
the outcomes of the game do not simply depend on strategies, but they are strongly 
linked to social context, path dependence dynamics, and focal points (Schelling, 1960, 
Ambrosino 2006).   
One of the main focuses of CE is the analysis of norms and institutions (Ambrosino, 
2006, 2012b, Rizzello and Turvani, 2000, 2002). Whilst legal theory has been much 
influenced by the development of behavioral economics, the cognitive analysis of 
institutions has not been considered. There are two main explanations for this lack of 
interest in the cognitive theory of institutions. The first concerns the different concept 
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of norms underlying the two research fields; the second relates to the fact that the 
cognitive theory of institutions is still far from developing a normative theory, and it 
focuses its inquiry on the positive level.  
Among the authors that have contributed to the development of legal theory and to the 
debate on the behavioral approach to L&E, Gregory Mitchell stands out for the 
originality his ideas.  
L&E and behavioral law and economics (BL&E) have both given too little attention to 
the role of institutional forces and social norms in constraining and coordinating 
heterogeneous individuals. Mitchell points out the relevance of this issue and he shows 
relevant points of contact with institutional economics that are not yet being 
investigated. 
Mitchell’s criticisms of BL&E and his contextualist approach to law represent a new 
bridge between cognitive economics and L&E by offering fresh opportunities for the 
development of a cognitive legal theory in which the core of the inquiry is the 
complexity of human behavior in legal contexts. Such a cognitive approach will also 
bring into the analysis of law relevant contributions from the tradition of Institutional 
Economics and from Original Institutional Economics (OIE)1. The tradition of that 
school of thought, in fact, is considered fundamental for the development of cognitive 
inquiry into economic institutions (Ambrosino, 2014, 2012a). The suggested cognitive 
legal theory shares many features with the I-H-C (Instinct-Habits-Culture) theory at the 
basis of OIE (Brown, 2007) and can contribute to updating it in light of new knowledge 
in other fields like anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience.   
Mitchell stresses the idea that agents are heterogeneous. His legal theory shares with 
CE and OIE the rejection of the perfect rationality assumption and it contests the 
existence of  “standard” bias in human behavior. Mitchell focuses on the need of a case 
specific inquiry in that social, economic, and cultural context play a central role. From 
a joint analysis of Mitchell’s legal theory, CE, and OIE emerges a common demand for 
a multi-disciplinary approach to develop a new legal theory that encompasses the 
importance of: (i) agents’ cognitive predispositions; (ii) learning processes and the 
influence of past experience; (iii) the role of context.  
This paper argues that Mitchell’s work represents an outstanding contribution to give 
new impetus to the development of a legal theory that can elaborate more dynamic 
analyses, and develop more nuanced, psychologically-grounded and empirically viable 
theories of human behavior. In this perspective the present discussion contributes to the 
recent debate on the future of institutional economics in that emerges the need of a new 
paradigm to investigate institutions stressing the role of complexity, uncertainty, 
severely bounded rationality, and the use of rules of thumb (Hodsgon and Stoelhorst, 
2014; Hodgson 2014)2           
This paper is organized into four sections: section 2 summarizes the main features of 
the CE of institutions and discusses its connection with OIE. Section 3. presents 
Mitchell’s main criticisms of BL&E while section 4. describes his contextualist 
approach and discusses his analysis of the role of second thoughts in debiasing human 
                                                            
1 The paper refers to Original Institutional Economics to indicate that line of inquiry that today goes 
back to the tradition of the Institutional School and particularly to Veblen’s work. 
2 See Hodgson and Stoelhorst, 2014, p. 53. 
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behavior. Finally, section 5. considers the opportunities offered by Mitchell’s 
approach to legal theory for the development of a cognitive legal theory. 
 
 
2. Cognitive economics of institutions and its connections with OIE 
 
Cognitive economics developed during the 1970s with the explicit aim of changing the 
tools and the core assumptions of standard economic theory (Bourgine, and Nadal, 
2004). This approach drew on the insights yielded by the cognitive revolution that 
focused on cognition defined as the inner workings of the human mind. The cognitive 
approach to economics rejects the neoclassical concept of human nature and 
investigates cognitive processes such as thoughts, mental representations, and 
consciousness in order to understand human decision-making. This new approach is 
based on the idea that understanding economic behavior is a complex issue and it 
requires contributions from different research fields (Camerer et al., 2005). CE 
investigates those mental processes that lead to the emergence of individuals’ 
preferences and shape individuals’ choices3. Contrary to standard economics and 
behavioral economics, the starting point for all investigations is the idea that individuals 
are strongly heterogeneous. Hence, their behavior is the product of idiosyncratic mental 
processes in which the environment, the social and institutional context, and the way in 
which social interactions are shaped play a very important role (Walliser, 2008, 
Bourgine, and Nadal, 2004).  
To date, the CE has not been applied to L&E. Nevertheless, the cognitive theory of 
institutions (North, 1991, 1994, 2005) can contribute to the development of a cognitive 
legal theory. Institutions have been considered as the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction (North, 1991); as rules of behavior 
emerging from the interaction among perfectly rational agents in repeated games 
(Schotter, 1981); and as governance structures (Williamson, 2000). These different 
definitions suggest that economics has for long considered institutions and individuals 
as separate concepts. CE of institutions, by contrast, stresses the need for a joint analysis 
of institutions and agents, in that they are considered to belong within the same 
framework (Ambrosino, 2006). The origins of this approach lie in the Old Institutional 
School of Veblen and in the Austrian School, particularly in the works of Commons, 
Menger, and Hayek. In this tradition, agents and institutions are strongly interconnected. 
Such interconnection implies a theory of human nature that replaces the standard homo 
economicus with a multidimensional human being whose socio-cultural background 
strongly influences his/her behavior (Jensen, 1987). From this perspective, institutions 
are defined as systems of established and prevalent social norms that structure social 
interaction (Hodgson, 2006). In Veblen's work, economic theory is based on three basic 
notions: "first, that behavior is governed fundamentally by ... instincts which give rise to 
action of a dynamic sort; second, that behavior is guided more proximately by 
institutions; ... third, that institutions, as viewed over the course of human history, have 
been in a state of slow but continual change." (Anderson 1933, pp. 618, 626).  Veblen’s 
idea of economic theory is close to Hayek’s theory of institutions where a rule (and, 
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hence, institution) is defined as any behavioral disposition, including instincts and 
habits, which can give rise to regularity in the conduct of individuals (1979). Rules 
(institutions) are based on a body of accepted beliefs that are strongly related to the 
social environment in that agents grow up (Dawson, 1998).  
Authors like Coase, North, and Williamson have enlarged the inquiry into economic 
institutions.4 These authors’ works on the endogenous emergence and evolution of 
economic institutions have contributed to redirecting the study of economic behavior. 
CE acknowledges the importance of such contributions and investigates the relationship 
between institutions and human behavior. From the perspective of CE, individual action 
and the rise of social norms have an important feature in common: the human mind. As 
institutions constantly interact with agents, they lose their purely functional nature and 
become themselves expressions of those human cognitive skills that are not innate but 
the result of repeated social interactions among agents (Ambrosino, 2006, 2012b). 
Institutions have the task of both constraining and driving human action. They imply 
some restriction on the choice set available to agents, but they also make available some 
choice options that otherwise would not be possible to choose (North, 1990). In doing so, 
institutions mold agents' aspirations (Hodgson, 2004, 2006). On the other hand, agents 
themselves have an active role in institutional change and evolution. Whenever the 
environment changes, they become actors promoting the slow process of institutional 
change (Ambrosino, 2006, 2012b). This implies the existence of a reciprocal causation 
process between individual behavior and the rise and evolution of social institutions. 
Social norms emerge as the result of human action and continuous feedback between 
agents and the environment. Social norms change through a slow process of cultural 
selection that allows the emergence of efficacious norms able to maintain social order 
(Hayek, 1988). To understand both the nature and the evolution of social norms, CE 
studies the micro-foundations of human behavior as the key elements in the social 
interaction processes essential for reciprocal causation between human behavior and 
institutions (Hodgson, 2003b, 2007). As suggested by Denzau and North (1994), there is 
a strong link between mental models and the institutional and cultural context. Hence, 
understanding individual mental processes requires explaining the rise and the 
evolution of institutions and social norms. CE of institutions stresses and investigates 
the role of (social, cultural, economic) context in the process of institutional change 
and in explaining how institutions come to light. In that sense, the cognitive approach 
to institutions shares some point of contact with the Coesian approach and new 
institutional economics. But CE doesn’t neglect the complexity of the issue at hand and 
the need of a historical/evolutionary approach (Pagano and Vatiero, 2014). It provides 
interesting tools to investigate the choices among alternative institutions that occur in a 
costly institutional framework characterized by numerous institutional 
complementarities. 
                                                            
4Coase’s work is developed by new institutional economics and L&E. NIE, following Coase’s 
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historical/evolutionary approach to the analysis of economic systems (Pagano and Vatiero, 2014). L&E 
includes Coase’s main contributions in its formal model but ignores the legal comparative and 
contextual dimension of his analysis (Frischmann and Marciano, 2014). 
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CE of institutions introduces a revision of the neoclassical assumptions and 
methodological tools. Most of all, the cognitive approach to institutions conducts an 
interdisciplinary inquiry based on empirical and experimental research (Ambrosino, 
2006, 2014). Cognitive economics has contributed to formulating new and consistent 
hypotheses on decision-making processes. Even if we are still far from a normative 
theory of human choice,5  CE has started to explain the processes leading to the 
emergence of institutions by means of theoretical tools like path dependence (Rizzello, 
2003). It has demonstrated the importance of learning processes in the emergence of 
norms and their social spread (Merlo and Schotter 1999, Ambrosino et al., 2007). It has 
shown the importance and the complexity of coordination processes in shaping 
institutional behavior (Schelling, 1960, Ambrosino, 2013). More contributions are 
offered by he neuro-economic approach, that contributes in the understanding of mental 
processes and their representation (Camerer et al., 2005; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, 
Glimcher et al. 2009). What emerges is that decision-making processes are highly 
complex and that choices result from the interaction between perception and conscious 
reasoning.6 CE of institutions grounds its investigation on a theory of human nature 
originating from Hayek’s theory of mind and improved by Veblen’s instinct-habit theory 
(Ambrosino 2012b, Rizzello, 2003), by Bandura’s theory of social learning (Ambrosino 
2006), and by more recent developments in psychology, anthropology, and neuroscience. 
This theory of human nature exhibits close connections with that underlying OIE 
(Ambrosino 2006, 2012b, 2014). These connections are due to two main factors: first, 
CE and OIE shared the rejection of the neoclassical assumption of homo economicus; 
secondly, they are due to the role that the tradition of the Old Institutional School plays 
in the development of CE. Most human behavior, according to the institutional view, is 
habit-driven and culturally regulated. Agents’ behavior is not immutable; it can change 
according to the reaction of instincts to external stimuli. OIE endeavors to explain: 1. 
how habits come to be established, and the role of instinct and culture in the formation of 
habits; 2. the process by which habits of behavior, and of thought change; 3. the 
correlation observed in the personal habits of those belonging to a given culture, social 
class, age group, or other relevant categories. Institutional theory explains these three 
points by means of a concept of human nature, which is known as the instinct-habit-
culture theorem (IHC theorem) (Brown, 2007). This theorem is the result of long 
discussion of the institutionalist concept of human nature since the time of Veblen until 
recent years. Institutionalists do not speak with one voice, but the differences of opinion 
concern the extent to which there is a dichotomy (referring to Ayres’s dichotomy 
between technological and ceremonial behavior (Ayres 1961)) in the nature of human 
beings. These are differences of degree rather than substance (Jensen, 1987). The 
institutional theory of human behavior is firmly based on three main ideas: natural 
selection, heredity, and variation. These ideas are linked to Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
and they enable explanation of the three points listed above (Brown, 2007). OIE 
approach to economic change and evolution is Darwinian in the Veblen tradition. Veblen 
considers Darwinism not merely as a biological but also as a philosophical and 
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methodological creed (Hodgson, 1998).   His idea of economics as a complex science is 
in strong opposition with neoclassical economics. Economic evolution implies 
cumulative causation: the process of cumulative change, that is to be accounted for, is 
the consequence of a change in the method of doing things (Veblen 1898, p.387). In 
the perspective of OIE a Darwinian evolutionary approach cannot assume an inert and 
immutable human nature (the perfect rationality assumption), on the contrary, 
economists must focus on change in habits of thought in economic communities and on 
the impact that social institutions have on the behavior of individuals by modeling their 
way of thinking and handling thinks (Vromer, 1995, 2013). A socio-cultural 
environment that is continuously evolving largely determines agents’ behavior. The 
socio-cultural individual pursues a multiplicity of goals and objectives (Jensen, 1987, 
p.1069). Hence, OIE uses research tools different from the apparatus employed by 
neoclassical economists to make predictions. OIE asks for a re-articulation of its research 
tools so that the complexity of social life can be explained properly: successful behavior 
depends on learning processes and particularly on social learning; the repetition of 
successful behavior leads to habit formation; institutional factors define the range of 
possible behaviors. What emerges is a close interconnection among agents, habits, and 
institutions. In this interconnection, CE of institutions shares the multiplicity of foci and 
avenues of inquiry of the OIE.  Cognitive institutional economics adopts Hodgson’s idea 
of a reconstructive downward causation process that links institutions and agents 
(Hodgson, 2003b), and it contributes to explaining this relationship (Ambrosino, 2006, 
2012 b, 2013).  
The debate on the consistency of the standard assumptions of L&E has not paid much 
attention to CE of institutions (nor to OIE). One reason for this may be that the definition 
of norms on which the CE of institutions is based does not coincide with the concept of 
law that is the focus of L&E. Cognitive theory of institutions shares Hayek’s definition 
(1952, 1960, 1962): institutions are those behavioral routines that become binding not 
because they are imposed by a legislator but because of the process of cultural selection 
and social interaction, through which they are selected (Hayek, 1962). As suggested by 
Hodgson, a “rule is broadly understood as a socially transmitted and customary 
normative injunction or immanently normative disposition that in circumstance X do 
Y” (Hodgson, 2006, p.3). This does not mean that there is no need for a legislator 
(Ambrosino, 2014); rather, it means that the efficacy of norms is not the result of 
planned action by the legislator but depends on how agents have perceived and applied 
those norms. The durability of norms of behavior stems from the fact that they create 
stable expectations about the behavior of others. Once again, cognitive economics’ 
conception of law relates back to the Old Institutional tradition. Many institutionalists, 
including Hamilton, Clark, Commons, and Hale, had significant and explicit interests 
in L&E. The major source of such interest derives from Ely and Adams. Many topics, 
such as the evolution of property rights, the legal context of transactions, intangible 
property and goodwill, valuation of public utilities, and many others, were covered 
(Rutherford, 2001). Nonetheless, in the Old Institutional tradition (and in the OIE), the 
analysis of institutions in not limited to legal norms and formal rules. There are many 
types of institutions that emerge and evolve in different ways. Some institutions appear 
and develop with little or no planning or state inference. The role of the state is 
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nevertheless important because an institution reaches an important stage of 
development when it becomes consciously recognized and legitimated by other 
institutions (Hodgson, 2002). This argument does not imply that the state is a more 
efficient solution than the bottom-up process of evolution of institutions. It suggests 
that the state can perform a regulatory role (Hodgson 2002).  By contrast, L&E has a 
restrictive conception of law. Law corresponds to legal norms, legal rules, established 
by the state. L&E both evaluates the efficiency of legal norms and develops a 
normative legal theory to promote allocative efficiency. Law is a system of rules and 
guidelines enforced through institutions. It is given exogenously by the legislator in 
order to maximize social welfare by promoting Pareto efficiency – or at least the 
weaker Kaldor-Hicks conception of efficiency. Hence, society has efficient rules 
because there is an efficient legislator who understands and plans legal norms able to 
maximize social welfare. Another possible explanation resides in the different aims of 
CE and L&E. The cognitive theory of institutions seeks to understand and explain the 
cognitive processes leading to the emergence of social norms; its analysis is therefore 
essentially a positive one. Whilst L&E has both a positive and a strong normative aim. 
Positive law and economics investigates the effects of existing legal rules in terms of 
their efficiency, while the purpose of normative L&E is to build a more efficient legal 
system in order to maximize social welfare. It is more interested in formal models, in 




3. Mitchell’s main criticisms of the assumptions of behavioral law and economics 
 
BL&E has introduced into legal theory the tools and the insights furnished by 
behavioral economics. Consequently, it is not surprising that BL&E now exhibits the 
same limitations as behavioral economics in developing new models with which to 
explain and predict the complexity of human behavior (Ambrosino, 2012a). 
One of the main criticisms brought against behavioral economics concerns the idea 
widespread in the discipline that it is possible to incorporate the complexity of the 
cognitive determinants of human behavior into the standard formal models of the 
neoclassical approach. The idea is that the assumption of perfect rationality can be easily 
replaced with a new concept of rationality that better explains the complexity of real 
decision-making processes. Hence, behavioral economics returns to being a research 
approach completely compatible with mainstream economics (Davis 2013). This 
tendency to build formal models, in which the existence of deviation from the perfect 
rationality assumption is explained by introducing new variables corresponding to 
particular biases assumed as commonly shared among agents, has also taken place in the 
behavioral approach to L&E (Korobkin and Ulen, 2000; Jolls, 2007). This replacement 
of the perfect rationality assumption guarantees that BL&E models, compatible with the 
mainstream, produce strong normative outcomes. BL&E has two aims: first, to explain 
why people do not act as they should (the benchmark being that agents should behave as 
the perfect rationality assumption expects); second, “propose a form of paternalism, 
libertarian in spirit, that should be acceptable to those who are firmly committed to 
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freedom of choice on grounds of either autonomy or welfare” (Sunstein and Thaler, 
2003, p.1160). BL&E describes a model of the individual that can be easily ascribed to 
the mainstream economic assumption (Fontana 2010, Davis 2013).  
Gregory Mitchell conducts a forceful critique against this trend and the normative 
models that have been developed. His first criticism of BL&E concerns the way in 
which scholars working in this field introduce into their inquiries insights drawn from 
the cognitive and psychosocial research of the past thirty years (Mitchell, 2002a, 2002b, 
2003). BL&E derived from the evidence of the existence of cognitive biases in human 
behavior, and that these biases are widespread in the population and are responsible for 
predictable and systematic errors (Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, 1998, Korobkin and Ulen, 
2000). But BL&E scholars fail in their attempt to criticize the perfect rationality 
assumption because their models do not develop a new concept of rationality including 
the complexity of human decision-making processes. They simply substitute the perfect 
rationality assumption with an assumption of “equal incompetence” (Mitchell, 2002a). 
Empirical research has shown homogeneous behavioral tendencies among agents. These 
behavioral tendencies in BL&E represent a sort of list of common deviations from 
rationality that characterizes the entire population. Assuming equal incompetent agents, 
BL&E can develop normative models prescribing how agents have to behave and how 
decision-makers can intervene to shape agents’ behavior and avoid their errors. This 
literature overlooks the substantial empirical evidence that people are not equally 
irrational and that human behavior is strongly influenced by situational variables 
(Hamilton, 2000): “The only way the lessons of behavioral decision research on 
bounded rationality can be manageably incorporated into behavioral models for use in 
the law is if these lessons apply widely and uniformly. If the rationality of behavior 
depends on particular characteristics of the legal actor or on even just a few 
characteristics of the situation at hand, then the development of behavioral models that 
are both realistic and predictive becomes enormously complex” (Mitchell, 2002a p. 83). 
Mitchell (2003a, 2003b) stressed the need for a legal theory focused on finding 
solutions to specific problems rather than on developing a general model of legal 
behavior. For this purpose is necessary a contextualist approach in which behavioral 
regularities are analysed with respect to discrete legal contexts. Mitchell (2003b) 
augmented his criticisms of the equal incompetence assumption by referring to the 
BL&E literature that assumes computational irrationality on the part of judges7 and 
juries (Ghutrie et al. 2001; Sunstein, 2000). BL&E portrays judges and juries as 
“cognitive misers” to signify that they are not fully rational actors and that their 
decisions are based on heuristics and affected by biases. This literature relies on the 
findings of cognitive and social psychology in regard to heuristics and biases (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1984, Worthington et al. 2002). “People are by nature ‘cognitive misers’…. 
when presented with complex information that they cannot easily understand, they tend 
                                                            
7 Judges need the illusion to based their decisions on logical reasoning (Holmes (1894): "perhaps one 
of the reasons why judges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or to put...a decision in terms upon 
their view as lawmakers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose 
the illusion of certainty…” (p.7). If the normative BLE is aimed at allowing judges to maintain the 
logical control of their reasoning, it needs the rationality assumption.  
 
 10 
to use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics to assists in their decision-making processes 
(Worthington et al., 2002 p. 157). Shortcuts and heuristics induce judges and juries to 
answer new questions with solutions already experienced in similar circumstances and to 
repeat their behavior. In this literature, the common use of heuristics is a basic feature of 
human judgment and it leads to systematic biases and errors. 
BL&E scholars do not understand that heuristic processing is only one mode of thought 
and that agents often do not act as cognitive misers. The attractiveness of the cognitive 
miser metaphor is due to the fact that heuristics provide efficient means with which to 
solve numerous and complex situations involving limited mental resources (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics can lead to favorable solutions but in many cases they can 
also give rise to biases and errors. Drawing on the evidence in support of cognitive 
heuristics provided by studies demonstrating that behavior is -under certain conditions 
and for some persons- more consistent with a heuristic rather than analytic mode of 
information-processing (Kahneman and Tvresy, 1982), the BL&E literature argues that 
biases and errors in judgment occur systematically and predictably when they really 
arise from cognitive heuristics.  
BL&E relies on the results obtained by behavioral research developed in other 
branches of economic theory and generalizes their significance. One of the main 
contributions on which the use of the ‘cognitive misers’ metaphor in legal theory is 
based is the pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky (1974). These authors argue 
that their “studies on inductive reasoning have focused on systematic errors because 
they are diagnostic of the heuristics that generally govern judgment and inference” 
(1974, p.313). But this does not mean that the so-called “K-T man” can be reduced 
simply to the use of rules of thumb and heuristics in judgment. It seems an excessively 
simple explanation of human decision-making. Mitchell (2002a, 2002b) argues that an 
individual’s behavior lies somewhere between the extremes of perfect rationality and 
equal incompetence,8 and it is not predictable with respect to different situations and 
contexts: “the likelihood that a particular decision or judgment will deviate from the 
ideal behavior derived from norms of rationality depends on a range of personal and 
situational factors… Even inside the relatively controlled environment of the 
laboratory, we see considerable variation in cognitive performance among individuals 
depending on their cognitive abilities, educational background, and affective state” 
(2002a, p.109) Legal scholars should not seek a general model of judgment and 
decision-making; rather, they should develop a contextualist approach that seeks to 
identify the conditions under which irrational behavior occurs. This is a necessary step 
towards developing possible remedies through education, incentives, reconfiguration 
of the judgment or decision framework, or other forms of intervention.  
The critiques to BL&E investigations in judges and juries decision making processes, 
contributes to a better understanding of the processes of law creation in the civil law 
countries. Mitchell underlines how decision-making processes are complex and context 
dependent, and provides relevant clues questioning the efficiency of law emerging from 
both judges’ deliberations and politics’ activities. Since politics' activity as lawmakers 
implies a political arena and coalitions and collective rationality, consider law creation 
                                                            
8 See also Schelling’s (1960). 
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as simply the outcome of shortcuts and heuristics necessarily disregard the complexity 
of the relationship between interest group and politics, and the influence of many other 
relevant interdependent factors that lead to the emergence of specific rules. Particularly 
politics and policies are strongly interconnected with corporate governance structures 
and the circularity of their relationship strongly influences the emergence of legal rules 
(Roe and Vatiero, 2015) 9. 
Mitchell (2003b) argues that there are three empirical claims in the extension of 
heuristics and biases research to legal judgment that BL&E scholars use to criticize 
L&E. First, they focus on the idea that the common use of heuristics leads to systematic 
biases and errors in judgment (Jones, 2001). Second, they refer to this literature to argue 
that the use of cognitive heuristics is a basic feature of human judgment. Third, they 
refer to the evidence that the heuristic mode of processing is the default mode and that it 
is often quite difficult or even impossible to override (Sunstein, 2002). Together, these 
three claims constitute a strong argument for the development of a normative legal 
theory that overcomes the existence of predictable limitations in legal judgment. They 
also support the need for a sort of anti-antipaternalism: that is, the idea that errors in 
judgment can be eliminated also by libertarian paternalism (Jolls, et al., 1998).  
Contrary to this literature, Mitchell shows that the cognitive miser model has important 
normative, methodological and empirical limitations that prevent research in law from 
achieving descriptive and predictive accuracy. The libertarian paternalism suggesting 
that planners can improve social welfare by setting default rules that create benefits for 
those who commit errors but cause little or no harm to those who are fully rational 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) assumes the pervasiveness and permanence of irrational 
tendencies but ignores less invasive forms of intervention that may help agents 
overcome their errors without altering the substantive rights of the parties (Mitchell, 
2005). Mitchell argues that describing behavior as rational or irrational requires a 
normative standard against which the behavior may be judged (2003b). Behavioral 
economics assumes that rationality requires logical consistency and coherence in the 
formation and ordering of beliefs and preferences (Kahneman, 1994, Simon, 1997). 
Standard economics assumes that consumers behave as if information is processed 
through perceptions and beliefs using strict Bayesian statistical principles (McFadden, 
1999). Rationality as coherence operates as a closed system. This means that the 
individual defines goals and beliefs so that behavior must be logically consistent and 
coherent with respect to those goals and beliefs. In the case of legal judgment, when 
evidence of an irrational judgment is found, many different explanations are possible, 
some of which make the irrationality of the decision questionable: “to reach a valid 
conclusion about irrationality of behavior requires attention to a larger context in which 
the behavior occurs: what did the judge understand the task or problem to be, what goal 
did the judge have, and what rules or algorithms did the judge try to apply in solving 
the problem?” (Mitchell 2003b, p.31).  
Mitchell’s second main criticism concerns the methods employed to test for cognitive 
biases and errors (Mitchell 2002b; 2003b). BL&E research underestimates situational 
and individual variations in behavior and employs relatively weak tests of the hard core 
assumptions of the cognitive miser model. The point is that the core of the research in 
                                                            
9  See Roe and Vatiero (2015).  
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heuristics and biases is based on statistical significance tests on experimentally-
generated and aggregate data. This body of research provides an interesting set of 
findings in general terms but with unspecified practical implications. In fact, its aim is 
to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur 
(Nagel, 1979), and behavioral research on judgment is concerned with people in 
general. In the tradition of experimental analysis of decision-making, the judgments 
obtained are summarized by averaging across all the experimental subjects. If 
individual differences among judges emerge, these differences are treated as “errors”, 
and an “average judge” is considered the most meaningful summary of judges. This 
approach has the advantage of ensuring generalizability. Therefore, rather than 
examining individual variation in judgment and choice, behavioral decision theorists 
typically assume that “to a first approximation, the thought processes of most 
uninstitutionalized adults are quite similar, and any variation in subjects’ responses is 
attributed to measurement error or random variance” (Mitchell 2002b, p.46). The rigor 
of experimental research is purchased at the price of generalizability of results and this 
trade-off operates most directly in those fields that use laboratory experiments to study 
how humans navigate complex social environments like BL&E. Mitchell (2012) 
replicates Anderson et al.’s (1999) study on the generalizability of psychological 
laboratory research, using a larger data set to determine whether the external validity of 
laboratory research remains defensible or whether there are identifiable patterns of 
external validity variation. His analysis points out that “the meta-analytic estimates of 
effects across research settings provide a good first test of the generalizability of 
laboratory results, but the limits of this approach must be acknowledged. The 
inferences to be drawn from positive results are limited by the diversity of the 
participant and situation samples found in the synthesized studies, and negative results 
require deeper inquiry into the causes of external invalidity” (2012 p.110). The external 
validity and generalizability differ across psychological subfields and across research 
topics within each subfield. Once again different contexts generate different results. 
The pattern of results suggests that there are systematic differences in the reliability of 
laboratory results across subfields, research topics, and effect sizes; particularly it 
depends on the representativeness of the laboratory studies synthesized in the meta-
analyses that provide the data used by the study (Mitchell, 2012).10  
Finally, Mitchell points out some empirical shortcomings. He criticizes the assumption 
of universality in cognitive processing underlying the use of the nomothetic approach 
by many psychologists and scholars in BL&E, and the idea that differences in behavior 
are little more than random error variations that can be controlled by using random 
assignments to experimental conditions. The idea that the mind is a sort of machine 
that is the same in all times and places dominated the cognitive view until recently 
(Fiske et al., 1998). More recent studies on judgment provide strong evidence that this 
                                                            
10 Mitchell’s discussion is related to the debate in psychology about the danger of relying on "statistical 
significance" as a measure of behavioral tendencies. Scientists (and journals) publish studies that 
"work" and place those that do not in the file drawer (Rosenthal, 1979). One answer to this problem of 
publication bias is that we can trust a result if it is supported by many different studies (Ioannidis, 
2008). But this argument breaks down if scientists exploit ambiguity in order to obtain statistically 
significant results (Simmons et al. 2011). 
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assumption is not universally correct (Nisbett, 2003).  
 
 
4. Mitchell’s contribution to a new legal theory 
 
Mitchell’s critique is the preliminary step in understanding his suggestions to develop a 
new legal theory in which the peculiarity of decision-making in legal contexts can be 
really explained. The critique of the equal incompetence assumption suggests the need 
for a new analysis in which heterogeneous agents are considered (Mitchell, 2002a, 
2002b, 2003a, 2003 b). This aim could be achieved by suggesting a constructive 
pattern of research showing which contextual features may be considered to model 
legal judgment. Mitchell -referring to most of the same literature as cited by BL&E- 
argues that agents deviate from perfect rationality, but they do so in different ways and 
in different contexts (Mitchell 2003a). Evidence on cognitive biases must be 
investigated in legal contexts so as to build an original and consistent map of evidence. 
A contextualist approach does not mean that each decision or judgment can be only 
analysed with respect to its uniqueness and hence related only to its micro-foundations. 
A contextualized approach acknowledges that features of the person, the situation, and 
the task have an impact on the nature and quality of judgment, and its aim is to find the 
information really needed to understand if the use of heuristics must be contrasted by 
introducing specific regulation changes: "an identification of particular types of person 
or groups of persons making particular types of judgments or decisions in particular 
settings who are most likely to engage in irrational thought processes that have adverse 
effects for themselves and others in light of their goals versus their outcomes, an 
identification of the frequency with which these irrational thought processes lead to net 
personal and/or social cost, an identification of means to overcome or avoid this 
unwanted irrational behavior" (Mitchell 2003b, p.23). This approach starts from the 
goals and the beliefs of the decision-maker and then examines if the final decision 
achieves those goals and beliefs given the environment constraint.11 This means that 
rationality cannot be judged in abstract: in fact, a behavior that is irrational in one 
situation may well be rational in another. A behavior in a particular context may be at 
the same time rational and irrational depending on the goals, the interpretation of the 
situation, and the tools used by any agent involved in the decision-making process. 
Behavioral research on heuristics and biases shows that judgment is sensitive to certain 
situational factors (such as frame, Tversky and Kahneaman, 1974) or to salient aspects 
of the environment (Schelling 1960), but rarely does this research consider the effect of 
the larger “social frame” (Mitchell, 2003b). Empirical legal research may obtain positive 
results by shifting from the metaphor of experimental psychology as a science aimed at 
finding effects with identifiable causes to that of the cartographer who seeks to draw an 
accurate and detailed, yet still abstracted, map of some segment of the world of legal 
behavior. 
Experiments are only one of the tools that can be applied to examine variations in 
individual behavior. The need for an interdisciplinary approach arises from the 
recognition that multiple forces combine to produce particular behaviors.  
                                                            
11 See Gigerenzer (2003). 
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Mitchell (2009), discussing the role of second-level thought in shaping human 
behavior, contributes to the development of the new legal theory and furnishes insights 
for developing further research. The starting point is the fact that legal theory has 
criticized the traditional model of the “intentional actor” who controls his/her thoughts 
and behaviors if motivated to do so. Part of the literature substitutes this model of the 
intentional actor with that of the “unintentional actor”, deriving this idea from analyses 
of discriminatory behavior (Hamilton Krieger, 1995), while BL&E describes judgment 
as the product of a non-deliberative thought process based on cognitive heuristics and 
rules of thumb. This literature is based on psychological models of actors which show 
that biases in judgment and errors often arise at the level of first-order thoughts: thoughts 
that occur at the direct level of cognition and are not intentional and not deliberative 
(Petty and Brinol, 2008). These models assume that agents are incapable of going 
beyond these first-order thoughts and that this is the cause of irrational and 
discriminatory behavior. This literature emphasizes the role of automatic and intuitive 
thoughts while neglecting the role played in decision-making by controlled and 
deliberative thoughts. It leaves little if no room for self-correction, arguing that 
individuals lack self-awareness of their biases, and it ignores the substantial evidence 
that agents learn through experience, that their initial judgments should sometimes be 
distrusted, and that they develop different techniques for employing second-order 
thoughts in order to overcome undesirable first-order ones. Second thoughts may be the 
products of conscious effort, but they may also be automatic corrections working at the 
unconscious level. The propensity to engage in self-correction (through both conscious 
deliberation and implicit adjustments) varies among persons and situations, but all 
cognitively normal people are able to engage in some amount of “metacognition” about 
their own thoughts (Loires, 1998). People may differ in their propensity for such 
reflection depending on their education, upbringing, values, or genetic endowment, but 
everyone possesses some level of ability in rethinking their own thoughts.  
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Figure 1: Mitchell’s process of Self-Correction. 
Source: Mitchell (2009) p.14 
 
Self correction can be better explained if the sharp distinction between conscious and 
unconscious processes drawn by BL&E is replaced with the idea that self-correction 
phenomena are described by a three categories model (Table 1) in which the boundaries are 
porous and phenomena assigned to the different categories are capable of occurring at 
different levels of consciousness depending on the circumstances of the particular decision 
problem. The sources of self-correction (Mitchell 2002a, 2009) override the distinction 
between System I and System II applied by BL&E and derived by Kahneman and Tversky 
(Evans, 2008).12 This is so because the second thoughts may occur within each system.  
This argument sets aside the generally accepted view that deliberative processes (System II) 
under certain circumstances de-bias intuitive (System I) processes. Mitchell’s self-
correcting second thoughts may appear to pertain to System II, but they are not assumed to 
require conscious effort or deliberation (2009). Agents’ ability to avoid biases depends on 
both individual predisposition and the influence of the concrete situation. While individual 
predispositions operate largely beyond consciousness, situational influences operate both 
above and below the threshold of consciousness. Understanding how second-order thoughts 
interact with first-order ones in legal contexts is of interest because it may enable better 
prediction of when biases will result in unwanted behaviors and what kinds of debiasing 
efforts are likely to be successful. Mitchell discusses the importance of second thoughts in 
the correction of biases in the domain of rationality and interpersonal relations, and he 
considers the implications of this inquiry for legal theory and law-making. The analysis of 
second thoughts acquires particular importance for understanding inter-group bias and 
discrimination, and their regulation. Not considering the existence of second thoughts leads 
to the false idea that “the expression of a first order bias in one time or in one setting will 
generalize to other times and settings” (2009 p.29). First-order biases are extremely 
sensitive to personal features and context; hence they cannot be considered stable cross-
situational preferences (Ayers, 2001). From the perspective of the regulation of 
discriminating behaviors, the fact that first-order biases may arise without consciousness does 
not mean that regulation to prevent intentional discrimination will not be effective. 
Prohibitions against intentional discrimination can remedy unconscious biases. The existence 
of explicit norms requiring conscious meditation on thoughts and behaviors can have positive 
effects. “Conscious attention to law’s prohibitions may, of course, lead to online monitoring 
                                                            
12 See Kahneman and Frederick, 2002. 
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of our behavior for bias, but conscious thoughts about the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of certain consideration may lead to offline debiasing as well, through the 
creation of metacognitive validity tags" (Mitchell, 2009 p.35). Mitchell suggests a 
metacognitive approach to regulation. Law will not simply change the prices of different 
behaviors for the purposes of a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of different courses 
of action. Rather, law will focus on altering the ways in which agent processes information. 
Law can be shown to be a system of second thoughts -functioning both consciously and 
unconsciously- that can contribute to influencing thoughts and behaviors in legal contexts. 
Mitchell provides concrete applications of his theory of law. The author (Monahan et al. 
2009; Mitchell 2010, Mitchell et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 2011) enters the debate on the 
proper scope of expert witness testimony that purports to summarize general social science 
evidence to provide context for the fact-finder to decide case-specific questions. Mitchell 
starts from the Dukes v. Wal-Mart case on gender discrimination toward female employees. 
Dukes’ plaintiffs submitted expert statistical evidence showing that female employees were 
faring worse in the aggregate than male employees, and a report by a social science expert 
identified a common source of this discrimination across all Wal-Mart facilities (Mitchell, 
2010, p.136). The social science expert based his report on the “social framework analysis” 
method (Fiske and Borgida, 1999). This method consists in using social science research as a 
framework for analysing the facts of a particular case. The reliability of such analysis is based 
on the reliability of the research on which the general conclusions applied to the case at hand 
are based. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the expert summarized research on gender bias, 
organizational culture, and anti-discrimination measures and applied it to interpret the facts in 
the discovery material supporting the claims of the Dukes plaintiffs. Mitchell argues that 
testimony based on that social framework analysis should be restrained from making any 
linkage between general social science research findings and specific case questions. In the 
specific case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart he based his critique on two main points: 1. in social 
framework analysis, experts use their personal judgment rather than scientific method to link 
social science to specific cases; in some sense, social framework analysis make the same 
mistake that BL&E does in extending the experimental economics results to its research 
purposes without dealing with context-specific research; 2. the expert corroborated his report 
with statistical evidence. But the statistical evidence was itself subject to dispute with regard 
to the proper unit of analysis. The plaintiffs argued for an aggregate-data approach. This 
choice did not allow consideration of context-specific differences due to store-by-store 
variation in male-female outcomes and to local control over personnel matters. Moreover, this 
use of statistical evidence is a concrete example of how statistical results can vary depending 
on the many decisions that researchers have to make while collecting and analysing data 
(which outliers to exclude, which measures to analyse, and so on).  Mitchell argues that there 
are social science techniques and methods that allow development of opinions about the 
parties or behaviors involved in a particular case; such evidence has been referred to as 
“social facts” (Mitchell et al., 2011). Social facts are special types of adjudicative facts 
produced by applying social science techniques to case-specific data in order to help prove 
some issue in the case. A wide variety of social science methods can be used to produce social 
facts. The design of a social fact study depends on what a party hopes to learn. Mitchell 
divides the search for social facts according to three main goals: 1. obtaining descriptive 
information: getting the facts right is important, but doing so can be difficult when the 
relevant facts are in the possession of a large number of non-parties; 2. obtaining explanatory 
information: gain a better understanding of the issue in a case. Many research methods can be 
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applied, such as interview, survey, observational study, experimental simulation; 3. testing 
specific hypotheses:  the ideal way to test causal hypotheses is through the use of experiments 
in which participants’ behaviors are recorded to assess how changes in the experimental 
conditions affect the behavior in question (Mitchell et al., 2011). Social facts constructed by a 
proper scientific method possess scientific reliability and fit the facts of a particular case. 
Such reliability depends on the reliability of the scientific method applied. Mitchell shows 
that when addressing such a complex task as deciding a legal dispute, it is necessary to rely on 
rigorous interdisciplinary research tools that help prove some issue in the case. 
 
 
5. Cognitive legal theory: new opportunities. 
 
Mitchell’s works today represent the most important attempt to develop a proper cognitive 
legal theory that shares the aims and the scope of the cognitive approach to economic 
institutions and that is also coherent with the tradition of the Old Institutional School and 
with OIE.  
The cognitive theory of institutions developed on the basis of the idea that it is not possible 
to separate investigation into the rise and evolution of institutions from the analysis of 
individual decision-making processes (North, 2004, Ambrosino 2006, 2012b). The 
institutional and the individual levels of analysis are closely interconnected, so that an 
institutional change may be the starting point for modification of agents' behavior, and new 
cognitive classifications or new routines of behavior can engender a slow process of 
institutional change (Hayek, 1982; Hodgson, 2004, Ambrosino 2006, 2012b, 2014). The 
cognitive theory of institutions starts its inquiry assuming that agents are heterogeneous; 
heterogeneity means that agents can exhibit different behaviors even if they belong to the 
same social and cultural context. That heterogeneity is not an insuperable barrier to 
coordination because agents are different but made up of the same ingredients (Hayek, 
1982). They are able to understand each other, to build correct expectations about each 
other's behavior, and to share common social norms. The shared social context, the 
existence of strong learning processes in society, and the importance of past experiences in 
shaping human behavior are the main factors responsible for the slow process of 
institutional change both in the CE of institutions and in OIE (Ambrosino, 2012b, Brown 
2007, Jensen, 1987). The foregoing review of Mitchell’s main works seems to represent the 
main contribution to developing inquiry into the “individual-institution” framework already 
described by the cognitive theory of institutions (Hodgson, 2004; Ambrosino, 2014). 
Mitchell’s critique of BL&E “provides reasons why legal theory should refrain from broad 
statements about the manner in which all legal actors process information, make judgments 
and reach decisions and why others should be skeptical of such broad claims by the legal 
decision theorists” (2002b, p.33); “legal decision theorists should recognize the need for 
greater caution and precision in drawing of descriptive and prescriptive conclusions from 
empirical research on judgment and decision making” (2002b p.32). Mitchell’s contribution 
is based on a strong belief in the utility of psychological and other empirical research for 
legal analysis. Mitchell seeks to qualify legal decision theory “rather than reject it and is 
meant to point out areas in need of further investigation and consideration” (2002b, p.34).  
Mitchell’s inquiry shares with cognitive economics the idea that agents are heterogeneous 
and that simply introducing the existence of “standard” biases in modeling human behavior 
does not enable the development of efficient predictive models. He points out -like the 
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cognitive approach and the OIE- that the perfect rationality assumption is not an appropriate 
instrument with which to investigate agents’ behavior; a proper theory of human behavior is 
needed. The existence of cognitive biases in legal contexts must be investigated in the field 
and with respect to specific contexts through “social facts studies” (Mitchell et al., 2011). A 
social facts study applies different research methods to explain case-specific descriptive or 
causal claims, and it is focused on the context-specific features of the case at hand. Agents’ 
legal behavior cannot be described as “equally incompetent” on the basis of the evidence of 
the existence of deviation from rational behavior found in other disciplines. Mitchell thus 
shares the argument of CE and OIE that the analysis of normative behavior cannot be 
separated from social and environmental aspects or from cultural and relational ones, and 
that a multi-disciplinary approach is necessary to develop better inquiry into the complexity 
of decision-making processes in legal contexts. The aim is to explain the micro-foundations 
of normative behavior by applying the tools offered by different research approaches to the 
normative context. His idea of a new legal theory, in which the cognitive determinants of 
agents' behavior are investigated, highlights the importance of: (i) agents' cognitive 
predispositions; (ii) learning processes and the influence of past experience; (iii) the role of 
context. The cognitive theory of institutions has already pointed out the importance of these 
three elements. Both the Old Institutional School (and today the OIE) and Hayek's legal 
theory have emphasized the importance of cognitive predisposition in normative behavior. 
The Old Institutional school of Veblenian tradition explains the relationship between 
economic and social institutions and habits. These are responsible for the strength, the 
normative power, and the duration in time of established institutions (Anderson, 1933). 
Hayek’s legal theory focuses on the role of classification processes in shaping agents’ 
behavior and the rise of shared social norms (1952, 1982). The importance of learning 
processes, and especially of learning from past experience, is a crucial aspect of Hayek's legal 
theory that has been developed by the cognitive inquiry into economic institutions (Hayek, 
1982). The cognitive approach has suggested that the dynamics of social learning play a 
fundamental role in the diffusion of normative behaviors and in the evolution of social norms 
(Bandura, 1977, Ambrosino, 2006). The context plays a decisive role in these dynamic 
processes of the spread and evolution of social norms. Both the cultural context and the social 
context, in fact, are able to shape the direction in which the dynamic process of change will 
develop (Hodgson, 2003, 2004). As argued in the paper, learning, and especially social 
learning is a key determinant of institutional behavior also in the old institutional tradition and 
in the OIE. 
Mitchell’s research approach starts with a “cartographic” inquiry aimed at understanding 
and describing behavior in legal contexts (2003b). He begins by investigating the ability of 
agents to correct their behavior with respect to particular decision contexts, under the 
assumption that each particular context implies the development of different behavioral 
routines (Mitchell, 2004, 2006). Mitchell’s inquiry enlarges the boundaries of the existing 
experimental literature on topics of interest to L&E and focused on decision-making under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty (Camerer, 1995), on the Coase Theorem (Hoffman and 
Spitzer, 1982), and on pre-trial bargaining (Loewenstein et al. 1993). Finally, Mitchell’s 
approach offers an important instrument with which to develop cognitive inquiry into the 
diffusion of normative behavior and institutional change, and it can furnish key insights into 
the opportunities offered by the development of prescriptive rules in shaping individual 
behavior. What emerges is a new meta-cognitive approach to legal theory in which norms 
are concrete instruments with which to induce agents to develop different ways of 
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processing information. Understanding human decision-making can furnish the legislator 
with the appropriate tools to develop normative instruments that prevent agents from 
committing errors. The analysis of second thoughts (Mitchell, 2009) suggests that normative 
constraints can contribute to making agents develop new cognitive classifications of the 
available information. The analysis of “social facts” shows how to build appropriate 
decision tools based on objective casual claims with which to evaluate and create new rules 
of law.  Moreover, Mitchell suggests an interesting way out of the impasse of the scant 
chances of developing normative models faced by the CE of institutions. In fact, his theory 
suggests a new way to apply scientific research results to normative purposes. What he 
suggests (Monahan et al. 2008) is that scientific results should constitute a sort of “social 
authority”: an organizing principle for courts’ use of social science to create or modify a rule 
of law. Social research and legal theory partially lose the need to furnish normative models. 
They become the research instruments that give judges and courts, and more generally the 
legislator, the information and the tools with which to evaluate and create new rules of law. 
Such scientific results can be even more useful because they are the result of “social fact 
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